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Filial Obligation in Contemporary China: Evolution of the Culture-System
Xiaoying Qi
Abstract
Family obligation, which has an exceptionally high salience in traditional Chinese society,
continues to be significant in contemporary China. In family relations in particular sentiments
and practices morphologically similar to those associated with xiao (filial piety) remains intact in
so far as an enduring set of expectations concerning age-based obligation continues to structure
behavior toward others. Researchers pursuing the theme of “individualization” in Chinese
society, on the other hand, argue that family obligations and filial sentiments have substantially
weakened. The present paper will show that under conditions of cultural and social change in
China filial behavior through family obligation continues to play an important role even though
the conventions associated with the relevant expectations, attitudes and emotions have undergone
significant change. The paper argues that the culture-system develops not merely through an
internal dynamic and that family obligation must be understood in terms of the social and
material context in which it operates and the nature of the motivations and imagery of the people
that practice it.
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Filial Obligation in Contemporary China: Evolution of the Culture-System

Introduction
Commentators observe that obligation has an exceptionally high salience in traditional
Chinese society and continues to operate in modern China. Hwang (1987, p. 944) notes that in
“Chinese society … norms of reciprocity (bao) are intense … shaped by the public nature of
obligations and by the long time period over which obligations are incurred”. Indeed, the
mechanisms of such obligatory relations are indicated by Chinese language terms such as mianzi
(face), renqing (social and moral norms of reciprocal favour or benefit) and huibao (reciprocal
obligation) in which regard for and commitment to others are central and highlighted.
In family relations in particular sentiments and practices morphologically similar to those
associated with xiao (filial piety) remains intact and provide an enduring set of expectations that
continues to structure behavior toward others (Whyte, 1997, p. 2005). Researchers pursuing the
theme of “individualization” in Chinese society (Yan, 2009, 2010; Hansen & Svarverud, 2010),
on the other hand, tend to emphasize the novelty of the category of the “individual” in recent
Chinese history. Yan (2003, 2009) argues that family obligations and filial sentiments have
substantially weakened in recent times.
Filial piety (xiao) has been regarded as a traditional element of Chinese society,
fundamental in its function of maintaining family obligation, including the provision of aged care
and support. According to Confucian doctrine xiao entails that adult children should exert
themselves to the utmost in the service of their parents in providing satisfaction of material needs,
and in showing reverence and obedience (Confucius, 2000, pp. 2, 4, 6, 14, 20, 44, 256). Adult
children are encouraged to avoid travelling far from their parents (Confucius, 2000, p. 44). In
spite of the enormous changes undergone in China in the 2,500 years since Confucius it is
frequently remarked that the importance of the Confucian notion of xiao persists today (Cong &
Silverstein, 2008; Whyte, 2005; Zhan, 2004). While the ethos and practice of family obligation
continue to have a major role in determining the behavior of both parents and their children the
meaning of xiao has been reinterpreted in various ways, however, and the institutional basis of
family obligation in present-day China operates in concert with the interests of the party-state
and the contextually based self-preserving motives of its citizens.
Given the significant changes mainland China is currently undergoing, through political
reform and marketization, the question arises of the impact of these changes on the pattern and
structure of social relationships. A significant marker of social change in Chinese society is
located in shifts in the sense and content of obligation that individuals feel toward others,
especially in family relationships. The present paper argues that with social and cultural change
it is unlikely that family obligation shall remain unaffected. The “individualization” argument,
however, exaggerates the degree to which individuals become free of their family obligations.
The paper shows that family obligations in China continue to play a significant role, even though
conventions associated with the expectations, attitudes and emotions involved in obligation
orientations undergo change. In this sense the argument to follow addresses Hwang’s (2012,
2014) culture-inclusive theories (see Bond, 2014) of Confucian relationalism (see Liu, 2014).
The discussion of family obligation will show how a core element of Chinese cultural heritage
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appears to persist over historical time, even though the meaning of its associated practices and
the institutional bases on which it rests are transformed by political and economic forces.
The paper will advance an empirically-based theory of cultural development which
supplements the indigenous psychology approach by indicating the role of the politico-legal and
social context in which values and norms operate. Such norms and values appear to have a
history and persistence beyond their current basis in effectively drawing on or replicating the
imagery of traditional practices. The theoretical model advanced below accepts that indigenous
cultural forms are both a resource for action and its possible rationalization and at the same time
an outcome of practices which are necessarily contextualized, politically and socially (Bourdieu,
1984; Swidler, 1986). The development of the culture system is therefore not through an internal
dynamic but interactionally evolved in concert with the larger institutional framework in which it
is situated (Qi, 2014, pp. 103–142). The impact on action of cultural forms, meanings and
precepts is conditioned by the wider socio-historical contexts in which both culture and action
are located (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; Swidler, 2001). The case to be dealt with in the
present paper, of family obligation in mainland China, has a clear inheritance profile of
Confucian filial piety and a politically changing context of communist party rule and a socially
changing context of gender relations and marketization. Expectation of individualization in this
mix are not realized through these developments, which produce instead a persistence of family
obligation morphologically similar to Confucian filial piety, but on a basis drawn from presentday institutional and social developments. These latter maintain a cultural formation that draws
on the imagery of traditional filial piety.
Enduring Characteristics or Diminishing Practice
Family obligation is an enduring characteristic of Chinese social structure, legitimated
and rationalized in Confucian thought (Fei, 1992; King, 1985). And yet this historical tradition is
today supported with legal codification and enforced against those who offend against the norms
of family obligation, who may be subject to legal sanction. Both the 1950 and 1980 Marriage
Laws stress reciprocal obligation of each family member for the welfare of the family as a whole.
In more practical terms, circumvention of bureaucratic control of job assignments and coping
with housing shortages, accessing resources and opportunities (Bian, 1994; Whyte, 1997, p. 22;
Yang, 1994) leads people to rely on favour-seeking or rent-seeking forms of guanxi relations (Qi,
2013, p. 310) and particularly to find support in family networks. These practices also tend to
reinforce the strength of family bonds.
The theme of “individualization” in Chinese Society, on the other hand, argues that
family obligation and filial sentiments have been substantially weakened during the reform
period. Those who support the individualization thesis point to cultural acceptance of an
ideological shift from self-sacrifice for kinship or collective needs to self-realization and selfinterest (Yan, 2009, p. xxiv). Indeed, since China opened its door to the outside world in 1978
exposure to western culture and particularly individualistic ideas has increased, especially among
young people. Individualism is understood to include a right to satisfy self-interest without
regard to the rights or needs of others. It is held that young people tend to promote their
individual rights in challenging the authority of parents and in failing to exercise traditional
bonds of filial obligation. Yan (2003, p. 189) emphasizes that the “most significant change with
regard to elderly support … is the disintegration and ultimate collapse of the notion of filial piety,
the backbone of old-age security in Chinese culture”.
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It is accepted here that China is presently undergoing cultural and social change in which
the conventions of family obligation and associated expectations, attitudes and emotions shall
also change. It will be shown, however, that the role of family obligation in the welfare of
individuals is unlikely to lose its importance in the near future in light of a number of current
changes in mainland China as well as the continuing absence of a social welfare system and the
interdependent reliance of adult children and their parents. Yan’s simple contrast between
collective needs and self-interest fails to appreciate the ego-centric nature of the Chinese
relational self (Fei, 1992, p. 67; see also Fung, 1998, pp. 635–636 and King, 1985), and, more
importantly for our present purposes, the significant but overlooked role of self-interest in family
obligation (Barbalet, 2013; see also Qi, 2013, pp. 319–321). The question which social
commentators and researchers face concern not the end of family obligation but the changes it
shall undergo and also the nature of the social and moral mechanisms through which it shall
continue to operate.
From Confucius to Mao to Confucius?
Family obligation and welfare provision for the elderly by their adult sons and daughtersin-law are regarded as key characteristics of Chinese culture supported by a hierarchical social
structure. According to Hwang’s (2012, 2014) analysis, pre-Qin Confucianists developed an
ethical system based on a delicately contrived balance of benevolence (ren), righteousness (yi)
and propriety (li) which advocated the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations between each dyad of
the five cardinal relationships (wu lun). The Confucian ethical system for ordinary people, set out
in a classical Confucian compilation, the Book of Rites (Li Ji) (Dai & Dai, 2004, p. 41),
highlighted the relative virtues of exerting oneself in realizing the values of “kindness on the part
of the father and filial duty on that of the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and
obedience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of the husband, and submission on
that of the wife; kindness on the part of the elders, and deference on that of juniors” within the
family.
These ethical principles encapsulated in the five cardinal relationships was transformed
by later scholar officials, during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–220 A.D.), into an absolutist ethics
of Three Bonds which was adopted throughout the territory of imperial rule. In this ethic the
absolute authority of the ruler over the minister is delineated, as well as the absolute authority of
the father over the son, and of the husband over the wife. This revised form of politicized filial
piety (Liu, 1996) is characterized as authoritarian moralism and cognitive conservatism which
underlie both the traditional and the contemporary ideologies (Ho, 1994). A number of writers,
on the other hand, argue that authoritarian filial piety no longer dominates and that reciprocal
filial piety is increasingly practiced (Hwang, 1999; Yang, 1995, 1996).
The relationship between governmental regulation and ethical relations and practices,
while conceptually distinct, are not so readily separated in concrete circumstances. Indeed, it
should not be forgotten that according to the Mencius state authority is to inculcate the five
cardinal relationships (Mencius, 2004, p. 60). What the preceding discussion considers is not
only whether the state plays a primary or secondary role in the maintenance of ethical systems
and the enforcement of ethical behavior in face of individual lapses but also the changing nature
of the ethical regime itself in terms of both the details of its constitution and the institutional
basis on which it rests. The idea that a set of ethical principles and the practices associated with
them may remain free of both political determination and social influence cannot be defended.
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What is required, on the other hand, is a clear understanding of the ways in which the norms of
conduct relate to the social and political framework in which they operate.
Family obligation as filial piety was traditionally institutionalized in imperial China by a
moral culture based on Confucian ideology reinforced by laws that favoured seniority (Leung &
Nann, 1995; Xu, 2001). In these terms family formation serves the principle of “yanger fanglao”
(raise a son to secure future prospects in old age) and “fumu zai, bu yuanyou” (when parents are
alive, children should not travel too far afield). There remains in China today a background
assumption that children have a duty to support their elderly parents and in particular that adult
children are called upon to sacrifice their own interests to ensure the fulfillment of their parents’
requirements. The psychological mechanisms implicit in these relationships are understood in
different terms. Ho (1994) regards the character of filial piety as authoritarian and he believes
that it justifies absolute parental authority over children, governing their socialization and
intergenerational relationships in general. Yang (1995, 1996), on the other hand, views filial
piety as a social-orientation through which reciprocity functions as a self-reinforcing power. A
sociological approach, on the other hand, avoids reification of the concept of filial piety and
treats the relationships to which the term refers as grounded in the prevailing politico-legal,
social and normative frameworks in which individuals are located and through which they
develop both accommodating and innovative strategies.
An investigation conducted during the early period of economic liberalization asked
respondents to place in order five reasons for having children (UNESCO, 1984, p. 112). Young
people in rural Sichuan typically chose old-age support as the first or second reason, whereas
young people in Beijing placed old-age support on average as the fourth most important reason.
It might be noted that in Beijing support of parents in their old age was not the last reason for
having children. These findings have to be placed in their historical and social context.
During the Mao era and especially during the Cultural Revolution forceful endeavours
were made to uproot traditional cultural values. Massive campaigns were directed to securing
ultimate loyalty away from kinship networks and firmly placing it with the Communist Party and
its instrumentalities (Vogel, 1965). Confucian ideology was attacked and the Maoist ideology of
class struggle, revolution and self-sacrifice to build an ideal communist society was promoted
(Madsen, 1984). During the period from the 1950s to the 1970s rectification campaigns had the
effect that the “traditional notion of filial piety lost its ideological and institutional ground” (Yan,
2009, p. 172). Yet while the traditional legitimation of filial piety was undermined, family
obligation itself was left intact. The Marriage Law of 1950 and all subsequent related legislation
explicitly stress the reciprocal obligations of each family member for the welfare of the family as
a whole. While conflicts of loyalty between the family and Party were resolved in favour of the
Party, the Party nevertheless stressed the continuing importance of family relationships for
individual welfare in the new China.
One of the structural consequences of the removal of the Confucian ideological basis of
family support in conjunction with the legal strengthening of the principle of family obligation
was the placement of the practice and carriage of filiality with daughters rather than sons (Whyte,
1997, p. 30). As a result of ideological transformation, institutional reforms and constitutional
changes during the Mao era women were liberated from traditional oppressions and prevailing
propaganda stressed their equality with men. From the late 1950s women were encouraged to
participate in public life. Urban women were able to work full-time in state or collective workunits and rural women became important in the labour force of collective farms. Through these
changes women were able to play the role of resource allocator in their interaction with their
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family members. Because they held the power to directly contribute to the family budget, their
influence within the family consequently grew. There thus occurred a shift from a patrilineal
emphasis, essential in the Confucian construction of filial piety, to a bilineal orientation, which
in turn led to a decline in parental preference in cities for sons, and daughters became
increasingly important as a source of support for aged parents, including in the provision of a
home, in both urban and rural areas (Davis-Friedmann, 1983; Hansen & Pang, 2008, p. 85). Thus
the change of institutional contexts entails changes in the nature and form of the cultural
resources on which people draw in their situated actions.
The enhanced status of urban women in mainland China today is supported by an
unintended consequence of the one-child policy, which began in 1979 and directed to population
control. Urban daughters have benefited from the demographic pattern which results from this
policy even though its negative impact, including forced sterilizations and abortions, increased
family tension, an unbalanced gender ratio, among other things, has drawn much political and
research attention. Without brothers urban daughters, unlike previous generations of girls, do not
have to compete for family resources. It has been reported that brotherless daughters receive
more resources than sisterless sons since parents “invest all their savings in their daughters’
education, rather than saving part of it for the purchase of marital housing”, as they would for a
son (Fong, 2002, p. 1104). Fong’s study reveals that parents now direct all their love, hope, and
need for old-age support to their only daughters, who in turn demonstrate that they could fulfill
the filial obligations once exclusively reserved for sons (Fong, 2002, pp. 1101–1102).
Since 1978 China has moved from a purely planned and collectivized economy to a more
market-based economy. Under these circumstances communist ideology no longer provides a
compelling basis for the values of self-sacrifice to secure collective goals (Yan, 2009, p. 33).
Indeed, a structural consequence of market relationships is attention to the individual person’s
own relationship with employment and consumer markets, which translates to an encouragement
for self-interested behavior. Another aspect of social life sponsored by Communist Party policy
which leads in the same direction is the family structure resulting from the one-child policy,
summarized as the 4–2–1 family; four grandparents, two parents, and one child. As the Chinese
family is increasingly child-centred (Bian, 1989; Guan, 2003) so the child him- or her-self
becomes self-focused or narrowly self-interested. While much is made of the importation of
western popular culture leading to individualism among Chinese young people, there is sufficient
in structural development in China itself to account for a move to “individualist” orientations. To
place this development in a theoretical framework: members of the younger generation have a
gradually increasing tendency to interact with their family members in terms of the equity rule of
deliberate calculation or of orientation to value ratios in the principle of market pricing (Fiske,
1992). The Chinese government has responded to these and associated developments through a
rehabilitation of Confucian ideology (Bell, 2008), or more accurately, adoption and modification
of New Confucianism created in Taipei, Hong Kong and Harvard (Dirlik, 2011; Song, 2003; Tan,
2008). Since 1978 New Confucianism is promoted to serve as a moral force in China, including
for filial obligation (Whyte, 1997, p. 23).
On-the-ground expression of these state-sponsored ideological developments includes the
voluntary contracts in rural China between elderly parents and their adult children, known as the
Jiating Shanyang Xieyi (Family Support Agreement). This form of contract was initiated by
cadres in Dafeng County, Jiang Su Province in 1985 and since then has been adopted throughout
rural China (Wei & Tao, 2002, pp. 1–5). The 2006 government white paper, Development of
China’s Aging Affairs, states that adult children and their parents in families are encouraged to
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sign Jiating Shanyang Xieyi. These contracts stipulate the content and standards for aged support
and are implemented and monitored through village (neighbourhood) committees or other
relevant organizations, which aims to ensure the right of support for the aged (SCPRC, 2006).
This contract, which is legally binding, functions on the basis of the foundation of filial piety as a
set of moral precepts (Chou, 2011). In other words, the government effectively rehabilitates filial
piety on the ground of reciprocity of relations rather than the authoritarianism of the Three Bonds.
By the end of 2005, 13 million rural families had signed such Jiating Shanyang Xieyi
(SCPRC, 2006). This is a relatively low although by no means insignificant take-up given that
the rural population is approximately 900 million with about 150 million over the age of 60
years. But this contract is not the only instrument enforcing the support of elderly parents by
adult children and is simply indicative of the legal basis of family obligation in mainland China
today. The major difference between the 1950 Marriage Law and the 1980 Law which replaced it
is a strengthening of the family obligation clauses. The 1980 law, in addition to the statement
that ‘children have the duty to support and to assist their parents’ adds what is absent from the
earlier Law, namely that if children fail to perform this duty, then ‘parents who are unable to
work or have difficulty in providing for themselves shall have the right to demand support
payments from their children’ (Article 21). The administrative support for compliance with this
part of the Law is not only in the Jiating Shanyang Xieyi but to be found in local enforcement
regimes.
The assertion of filiality in other forms at the level of government directives is evident in
events during 2012 and 2013. In early August 2012 Quanguo Laoling Ban (China’s National
Bureau of Senior Affairs) released the New 24 Filial Exemplars. Some points of these exemplars
are included in a draft Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Seniors. The
Communist Party Organization Department of a county in Huaihua, Hunan indicated that
applicants who are found to be not providing sufficient care for their parents will be ineligible for
party membership (Zhuang, 2012, p. A6). The party secretary of the Qufu (the hometown of
Confucius) municipal government is reported to have said that officials who did not show due
filial piety would not be promoted (South China Morning Post, 2012, p. A11). From the end of
April 2013 the local government in Qufu requires all citizens to pay their parents a monthly
allowance and to take them for a haircut at least once a month, and a thorough health check at
least once a year (South China Morning Post, 2013, p. A12). Filial piety, as a form of cultural
meaning, is highly codified and sustained by institutional sanctions which have a significant
effect on how individual actions are interpreted by others, and that limit the range of courses of
action available to persons (Abramson, 2012, p. 173).
On-line responses to the New 24 Filial Exemplars both indicate support from parents and
adult children for the idea of filiality and also an unwillingness or inability to sacrifice their own
interests in order to look after aged parents (CDnews, 2012; CE, 2012). It was reported that
people thought that it was not feasible, in supporting aged parents, for adult children to give up
their jobs – or their spare time or leisure – to do so, but considered that appropriate support of
aged parents could come in the form of money contributions to hire a helper. The emotional
commitment of adult children today is more likely to be placed with their conjugal family rather
than with their parents. This is the opposite of traditional expectations in which parent-son
relationships are central to family life and superior to other family relations, including conjugal
ties (Freedman, 1966; Yang, 1968). The shift in primary emotional responsibility of adult
children from their parents to their conjugal family should not be understood, however, to mean
that adult children feel that they have no responsibility to their parents’ wellbeing, including their
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emotional wellbeing. Adult children, as Vaisey (2008, 2010) says in a different context, seem to
pursue the strategies for which they are best equipped; and, in general terms, can ‘clearly make
choices rather than following pre-ordained cultural scripts’ (Abramson, 2012, p. 160).
To conclude this part of the discussion: It is possible to show that family obligation,
particularly in terms of material support for the elderly, will not atrophy as the proponents of the
individualization argument suppose. Indeed, family obligation will continue to play an important
role in Chinese society in the foreseeable future. This is not to say that past structures or patterns
of family obligation and filial piety remain unchanged. They do not. The issue, however, is not
whether family obligation will disappear or persist, but to consider how the conventions and
practices associated with family obligation shall continue to change. The question is not whether
adult children will or will not sacrifice themselves for their parents but rather what social
imperatives are responsible for emergent patterns of parent-adult child interactions and what
form of support and on what basis adult children feel obliged to provide to their elderly parents.
Absence of Social Welfare System and the Persistence of Interdependent Relations
A millennially-held tradition in China is that the care of the elderly is the responsibility of
family members, never the government or the wider society. China has never had a
comprehensive welfare infrastructure and a system of state provision for elderly care is absent in
mainland China today. This situation is likely to persist. As one researcher notes: “neither the
Communist Revolution nor the post-1978 reforms represent any significant break” from this
tradition (Ikels, 1993, p. 307). In 2000 elderly care homes managed by the state and collective
units provided beds for only 0.8% of their target population (Wong, 2008, p. 90). Wong also
reports that at the end of 2011 state-run old age homes numbered 2,700 whereas NGO run
homes exceeded 36,000 (Wong, 2008, p. 90). In western societies, in which care for the elderly
is widely recognized as a state responsibility, there is an ethos of independence from rather than
deference toward elders which the elderly themselves share, which includes their taking pride in
their independence from adult children (Finch, 1989; Hajnal, 1982, pp. 449–494; MacFarlane,
1986). In China, on the other hand, an elderly parent’s source of pride is in a demonstration of
their reliance and therefore their dependence on the care provided by their adult children.
Only the childless elderly are eligible for state-provided “five guarantees” benefits, which
cover the basic livelihood needs of food, housing, clothing, and health care as well as burial costs;
which are provided at the lowest subsistence level (Thogersen & Ni, 2008, p. 13). Most rural
elderly receive neither pensions nor health benefits, and so are forced to rely on their adult
children for financial support when they lose their ability to earn an income. Though many urban
aged persons receive a modest pension there are no built-in guarantees against inflation and
many suffer pension reductions if their prior work-places perform poorly or close-down (Ikels,
1993, p. 312). It is reported that “just under a quarter of the mainland’s elderly residents survive
on pensions, while more than 40 per cent seemingly rely on family members” (Yan, 2012, p. A7).
Health care has become an issue for many elderly since their medical costs are only partially
covered due to work place reforms as a result of withdrawal or reduction of state subsidies since
1990s (Ikels, 1993, p. 312). Moreover, both urban and rural elderly people are left with no option
but to rely on their family for care when they become physically dependent (Liang & Gu, 1989;
Thogersen & Ni, 2008, p. 31; Whyte, 2005). An online survey conducted in early October 2012
found that “about 90 percent of the public was seriously concerned about their quality of life in
old age” (Yan, 2012, p. A7).
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According to the sixth national census of China’s population in 2010, there were 178
million people over 60 years of age, constituting about 13.3 per cent of the total population. It is
estimated that by 2050 the aged population will increase to 430 million, constituting more that 30
percent of total (Yan, 2012, p. A7). Not only is China aging at an unprecedented rate but care for
the elderly is increasingly becoming an intractable social problem. When the population lived in
settled communities and there was an absence of significant geographic mobility then the
physical presence and co-location of adult children meant that the needs of aging parents were
likely to be met. At the present time in China there are increasing numbers of workers who leave
their birth-place and the vicinity of their parents’ location in order to seek employment in distant
cities. Additionally, the massive reduction in Chinese fertility rates means that there are fewer
numbers available to support a growing aged population.
Rather than accepting the responsibility of the welfare for its elderly citizens the Chinese
government has persistently reinforced the liability of family members for aged care through
propaganda and constitutional measures. The 1996 Law on the Protection of the Rights and
Interests of Seniors, which remains in force today, states: “aged care primarily relies on the
family, family members are responsible for the care and welfare of the elderly” (LPRIS, 1996,
Article 10); it goes on to assert: “The care-giver has an obligation to provide economic support,
life care and moral comfort, and attend to the elderly’s special need. The term “‘care-giver”
refers to a daughter or son of the elderly, and those others who are legally obliged to provide for
their care” (LPRIS, 1996, Article 11). In the absence of state-provided welfare the aged have no
option but to reply on their adult children for the satisfaction of their needs.
The structure of Chinese families continues to be one of mutual dependence rather than
independence. Economically, socially and emotionally Chinese family relationships tend to be
close and inwardly directed. It is not unusual for Chinese adults to receive financial support from
their parents. Such support takes various forms, including meals at parents’ home, financial
contribution to a mortgage or purchase of a house for marriage, paying for a marriage, tuition
fees and educational expenses for a grandchild, and so on. Whereas the ethos of western families
is to encourage adult children to live independently from their parents and to take pride in
financial and emotional independence, a Chinese adult is more likely to be encouraged to receive
parental financial assistance and encouraged to seek close emotional support from their parents.
Additionally, adult children in China typically rely on their parents’ provision of domestic chores
and child care. Parents continue to provide advice to their children even after they attain
adulthood, and continue to provide assistance “through the mobilization of personal contacts to
help solve particular life problems” (Whyte, 2005, p. 19). In terms of love and marriage, both
rural and urban young people are increasingly free to independently find a spouse even though
their parents’ advice and preference would be taken seriously and the family’s interests would
feature in making a decision concerning the choice of a husband or wife and arrangement for
marriage (Hansen & Pang, 2008, pp. 82–84; Unger, 1993, p. 37). In these and connected
relationships there is a continuing basis for the sense of obligation to care for and support elderly
parents experienced by adult children in mainland China.
Parents and their grown children are embedded in a wide variety of mutual exchanges
and frequent interactions summarized as “wangluo jiating” (networked families) (Whyte, 2005, p.
18; Unger, 1993, p. 42). Unger (1993, p. 40) notes that “even those parents who live apart from
their married children still tend to maintain very close mutual contact, more so than would be the
norm in most Western societies”. In this structure of continuing interdependence aging parents
form a clear and forceful expectation that their own needs will be satisfied by their adult children.
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Social Mechanisms
The dramatic changes in social structure since 1949 in mainland China have freed
families from the authoritarian filiality of the Three Bonds, but at the same time they facilitate
Chinese family relationships of continuing interdependence, which operate in terms of an
informal “intergenerational contract” (Ikels, 1993). This means that parents form expectations
that the deprivations they experienced in supporting their children from infancy and continuing
through adulthood will be returned in kind by their adult children when they are in need through
old age. These expectations are not only for material support but also for expressions of gratitude
and emotional commitment. This is a form of reciprocal family obligation which “encompasses
emotionally and spiritually attending to one’s parents out of gratitude for their efforts in having
raised one, and physical and financial care for one’s parents as they age and when they die for
the same reason” (Yeh and Bedford, 2003, p. 216). It is not unusual for a Chinese mother to
advise her child: “I gave you life and I raised you up. I sacrificed myself for you”. By the same
token an adult child may remark: “No matter what I do I wouldn’t be able to repay what my
parents did for me”. In this sense a person’s identity is interdependent and inclusive of family
members (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). One experiences one’s self as a related- or interdependent
self. As Stafford (1995) shows for children growing up in Taiwan there is in Chinese families
more generally a structure of mutual interdependence in which children are encouraged to be
devoted to and have a continuing sense of indebtedness to their parents. Chinese children
experience a familial and social milieu in which the sense of obligation to return their parents’
love and “sacrifice” is so deeply imprinted that it becomes part of their mentality. In this way “a
sense of obligation for all that parents had already done for one, as well as ties of affection, was
expected to make the care of parent seem ‘natural’, an inescapable aspect of the parent-child
bond” (Ikels, 1993, p. 308). The sense of “sacrifice” and “indebtedness” that comes to function
as cultural meanings not only carries emotional weight but in becoming internalized serves a
larger cultural script that has pervasive social influence (Ferree & Merrill, 2000). In this context
it is not surprising that while adult children have more open and individualistic attitudes on a
range of political, social and cultural issues than their parents, they share similar views
concerning family obligation and filial support (Whyte, 2005, p. 20).
In recounting the interaction between fathers and sons in Catholic working-class Boston,
Sennett and Cobb (1977, pp. 119–135) describe their relationship, which in some ways is similar
to the relations within Chinese families indicated above, as a “sacrificial contract” or “sacrifice
as a contract”. In the Bostonian case the father feels betrayed by his son when he does not
receive respect, gratitude and love and loses continuing control over him. At the same time the
son feels betrayed while the sacrificial contract was not of his making and “because his father
has taken him on a ‘guilt trip’ … a way parents have of manipulating [their children], rather than
really loving them” (Sennett & Cobb, 1977, p. 134). The difference between the Bostonian and
the Chinese sacrificial contracts is that the Bostonian contract is based on support given to a
dependent child who is expected to become independent at maturity. This maturational
independence undermines the sacrificial contract. As Chinese parents continue to have an
interdependent relationship with their adult children a sense of betrayal is less likely to be
formed. But in addition to the continuing interdependence between parents and their adult
children there is another mechanism which tends to limit in China the sense of betrayal that
issues from sacrificial contracts in Boston.
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It is necessary to examine further the social mechanisms which maintain family
obligation in China. Inherent in obligation is an expectation of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960;
Hwang, 1987). This expectation, that in the long-run a parents’ felt need to make some sacrifice
for their children shall be repaid, is part of the normative mechanism that consolidates the
veracity of obligation. The expectation that a future need shall be met by the other maintains the
normative structure of reciprocity. Given the continuing absence of state provision of aged care
in China an adult child is aware that their own old-age care will be secured from their own
children. In these circumstances it is in their interest to not set a bad example in how they treat
their aged parents. Within the relationships internal to the family, then, it is not contradictory that
self-interest in a person’s need to secure their future aged-care from their children will lead them
to promote the moral virtues of filiality to those children, which can only be demonstrated by
their own support of their aged parents. In this way the interactive effect of state regulation on
the one hand and individual interests and expediency on the other articulate in the advancement
of values and norms that draw upon the language and heritage of filiality which continues to
operate in Chinese cultural areas.
In the circumstances described in the preceding discussion there is a continuing moral
approval of filiality throughout mainland China. This shall continue to be supported through
social approval or sanction in terms of face relations in which filial behavior shall enhance face
and unfilial behavior lead to loss of face (Qi, 2011). Therefore, “even parents without resources
or without the affection of their children were not entirely powerless. In a small village or a
tightly knit community any child known to be unfilial risked public censure and jeopardized his
other social relationships” (Ikels, 1993, p. 308). As indicated above, such social sanction is
supported through legal and political means. The notion embedded in Chinese Buddhism, that
one’s actions have a cause and consequence, that there is an effect – including revenge – from
laotian (heaven) or ghosts, tends to continue to provide an element of sanction against moral
transgressions, not only in rural but also urban China.
Continuity and Change
Family obligation to provide support for the elderly has survived and continues to play an
important role through political-constitutional, social and economic changes. Chinese elderly
people have never had any inclination from a perspective of citizen’s rights (Thogersen & Ni,
2008, p. 35) to demand support from the government. Neither do adult children have a
perspective from which they can envisage a governmental role in or responsibility for their
parents’ old age care. Personal income tax is quite recent in China, introduced as late as 1980,
where “traditionally income tax was nonexistent” (Hsu, 2005, p. 111). Personal income tax
revenue constituted less than 0.1 percent of total tax revenue in 1986, approximately 1.5 percent
in 2005 and 2.5 percent in 2008 (Piketty & Qian, 2009). The basis of expectation in Western
Europe of state provided aged-care comes from a long history of fiscal development that includes
not only a liberal economy, social democracy and the welfare state but also two world wars
through which universal military service led to post-war welfare reforms (Flora, 1986, pp. XII–
XV), all of which are absent in Chinese history. The expectation of aged parents, that their adult
children shall support them when the need arises, and the expectation of adult children that this
obligation must be discharged, continues to shape the personal lives of the overwhelming
majority of people in mainland China. What has changed, however, is the basis and grounds on
which family obligation is performed, and the attitudes and emotions associated with family
obligation.
11

The most publically obvious indicator of family structure is the residence pattern of
family members. The traditional form of Chinese households is represented by co-residence in
which more than two adult generations resided together. Increasingly, however, sons establish
their own households on marriage so that families now typically occupy separate residences
(Whyte, 2005, p. 16; Yan, 2009, pp. 57–84). In both rural and urban areas parents of adult
children are more accepting of living arrangements in which their son and his family reside apart
from them. Such residential patterns no longer threaten to attract the charge that non-cohabitation
indicates a parents’ failure to raise filial sons or a son’s disgrace for behaving unfilially. Parents
increasingly keep an open mind about the choice to live independently as it is easier “to maintain
intergenerational harmony by reducing the children’s burdens to a minimum” (Thogersen & Ni,
2008, p. 29). In this way the “conciliatory” behaviour of parents toward their married children
can be seen as part of a strategy in which obstacles are reduced for the aging parents to either cohabit with or live close by their adult children at a later time, when they are too frail to look after
themselves (Yan, 2008, pp. 5–6). In this context, then, the growing trend among the elderly to
live independent of their adult children need not imply a deterioration of the family support
system (Yan, Chen & Yang, 2003, p. 163).
The evidence of anthropological and sociological studies indicates that a major
development in Chinese family relationships is a shift in the focus of adult children from a strong
son-parent alliance to a primary concern with their conjugal family, but this does not mean that a
close emotional contact with their parents is not maintained. At the level of the cultural system it
can be said that while the present state of family relations in China tends to contravene the
authoritarianism of the Three Bonds these relations are arguably consistent with the reciprocity
internal to aspects of the formal structure of the five cardinal ethical relations (Hwang, 2014; Tu,
1998) if not their content. It is necessary to add this qualification because in its original form
filiality related exclusively to father-son consanguinity whereas today in mainland China
daughters rather than sons have a central role in family obligation, unthinkable in traditional
society, as kinship ties between a married woman and the family of her birth were greatly
attenuated and her dominant if not total family loyalty was with her husband’s parents and never
her own. Adult children regard it as their responsibility to support their parents; but this does not
mean that in doing so they will sacrifice their own interests or support their parents
unconditionally even against their spouse, as Confucian tradition requires. Adult children are
prepared to provide support to their parents, but they are less likely to tolerate or allow their
parents’ behavior to jeopardize their conjugal relations (Thogersen & Ni, 2008, p. 21).
As a result of institutional reforms urban individuals have more autonomy to seek
employment in other cities, and rural people have more opportunities to join the urban labour
force (Quach & Anderson, 2008). Those adult children who leave home in rural areas will not be
able to visit their parents regularly or perform duties of care in person. However, this does not
entail that they have an excuse through their absence to evade family obligation. Such
individuals typically provide financial assistance through remittances to cover the cost of
housing aged parents, and their medical care or the hire of a helper. As Hansen and Pang (2008)
indicate, those young people who leave home typically continue to discharge their obligations
toward their parents. Though there are rapid changes in intergenerational relations, family
concerns remain the most important collective force for both young and old (Hansen & Pang,
2008).
Women who continue to play an important role socio-economically have more influence
in family affairs than in the past. Daughters are regarded as even better sources of support for old
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age than sons since daughters are not only able to contribute financially but more importantly to
provide emotional support and practical physical care. Women’s increased social power leads to
a change of their focus in performing filial obligation. Instead of looking after parents-in-law, as
in traditional expectations, contemporary daughters have “increased capacity to act as daughter
caregivers for their own parents” and “more power to decline or refuse to provide support for
their parents-in-law” (Xu, 2001, p. 312).
Conclusion
It has been shown in this paper that a number of factors tend to support familial
obligation in China that have some morphological relationship with Confucian filial piety but
operate on an entirely different basis and have a distinctive structure. The structural basis of
family obligation in present-day China is the continuing dependence on family members for aged
care in the absence of state-provision of welfare. This structural basis of family obligation is
sustained by the continuing inter-generational interdependency of family members through
which adult children are supported by their parents in various ways including through execution
of domestic responsibilities.
Changes in the present structure of family obligation include the increasingly important,
indeed predominant role of daughters over sons, which is a reversal of the traditional form. There
is a tendency toward and more acceptance of separate residence of adult children and their
parents. The adult children’s focus has increasingly moved from the home of their parents to
their conjugal family. There is continuing re-interpretation of filial piety and renegotiation in the
practice of family obligation. Underlying all of these developments is the individualization of
Chinese society in which self-interest paradoxically drives behavior for both the satisfaction of
the present needs of elderly parents and the future needs of their adult children. Those who
assume that the individualization of Chinese society undermines family obligation neglect the
importance of the shaping influence of state policy and the self-interested actions of adult
children in satisfaction of their own future needs.
Similar trends of change in filial piety presented in current reviews of previous
sociological studies conducted in mainland China can also be found in the results of empirical
research conducted by indigenous psychologists in other Chinese societies which have not had
the experience of an anti-Confucian Cultural Revolution, such as in Taiwan (Yeh, 1997) and
Hong Kong (Yang, 1988), or communities in which Chinese people have accommodated to
modern Western culture such as America (Yu, 1983) and New Zealand (Liu, et al., 2000).
The tendency to understand social behaviour only in terms of norms and ideational forms
possibly arises from a confusion of the well-springs of action on the one hand with justifications
for such action on the other. This is not to say that norms have no place in understanding
behaviour, including behaviour in families. The present discussion of family obligation in
mainland China acknowledges an historical Confucian background in the principle of filial piety,
understood as a practice of generational hierarchical obligation of a patrilineal form. But
Confucianism, including its codification by literati and scholars, is not the basis of the practices
or concerns of Chinese people, who drew on many cultural traditions and in their behaviour
operate in a context much broader than any given normative framework which is itself subject to
change as their political and material circumstances change. This is mentioned here because it is
necessary to indicate that the culture-system does not develop merely through an internal
dynamic and that the cultural forms of family obligation must be considered in respect to its
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development in terms of the social and material contexts in which it operates and the nature of
the motivations and imagery of the people that practice care of elderly parents.
The focus of the present paper on family obligation in mainland China has shown that the
context and basis of present practices include the politico-legal framework of the 1980 Family
Law and associated legal and administrative apparatuses, including the absence of stateprovision of welfare entitlements, as well as the social developments associated with
fundamental changes since 1949 in gender relations associated with female empowerment and,
since 1978, economic liberalization and marketization. The relevance of inheritance of the
imagery of Confucian filial piety is also important in consideration of family obligation. The
present paper has shown, against the individualization argument, that family obligation remains a
core element of the mainland culture-system. The development of that system has been shown to
be not the result of internal elaboration but interaction with the politico-legal and social context
in which it operates. Hwang’s (2012) analysis of the deep structures of Confucianism elegantly
indicates the articulation of conceptions of destiny, ethics and self-cultivation. Filial piety is not
only a single element of this conceptual reticular but also a single aspect of ethical relations
within the family. The relationship between adult children and their parents in mainland China
today is morphologically similar to the obligatory elements of Confucian filial piety, from which
it draws its imagery. Its basis in the laws and administrative apparatus of the communist partystate and the gender relations of intensive daughter involvement and significant atrophy of son’s
primary contributions are un-Confucian and the expedient and self-interested rationale of
obligation to aged parents, while not necessarily external to the practice if not the letter of
Confucian ethical relations, operates as a non-ethical value in the practice of family obligation.
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